2019/5/22 – CRI Report

Research Report on China’s Condom Industry, 2019-2023

admin — Wed, 22 May 2019 07:01:17 +0000

Description
According to CRI, as China’s economy develops and Chinese people pursue higher living standards, the functions of condoms have extended from avoiding conception to preventing sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and improving the quality of sexual life.
Since 2002 when the Chinese government liberalized the control over the condom industry, China’s condom industry has achieved fast development. According to CRI, the annual production volume of condoms in China was only about 1 billion units in 1995 while it exceeded 13 billion units in 2018. At the end of 2018, the annual production capacity of condoms in China exceeded 20 million units. In addition to satisfying domestic demand, China-made condoms are also exported in large quantities. In 2018, China’s condom exports exceeded 3 billion units.
Considering the family planning policy and the prevailing commercial sex, every year, the Chinese government purchases over 1 billion condoms from about 20 designated manufacturers for distribution to encourage population control and reduce the incidence of STDs. The unit price is only about CNY 0.20 to CNY 0.50 (USD 0.03 to USD 0.08) on average. With such limited budget, the condoms purchased by the government are of poor quality. Because of few distribution channels and the relaxation of the family planning policy, government at all levels are buying less condoms at higher unit prices.

Research Report on China Condom Industry, 2021-2025
The condom market excluding government procurement is a competitive free market. There are hundreds of condom enterprises in China, most of which do not produce condoms but rely on ODMs or OEMs. Some of them even import condoms in large quantities from Thailand and other countries. In 2018, the unit retail prices of commercial condoms ranged from CNY 0.50 to CNY 20, representing a market size of over CNY 10 billion. The high profit margin has attracted many market players. In China, condoms brands fall into three categories: (1) brands that produce and sell products in China, for example, Durex and Jissbon; (2) brands that sell products in China but base production abroad, for example, Okamoto and Trojan; and (3) brands that rely on OEMs for production and the Internet for sales, for example, Daxiang. Some other condom enterprises survive on government procurement and supplying condoms on an OEM basis because their own brands do not sell in lack of commercial sales channels and brand awareness.
As some Chinese consumers believe that imported condoms have higher quality than domestic-made ones, China imports a large quantity of condoms every year, mainly from Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, etc. In 2018, the import value of condoms exceeded USD 100 million, representing a trade deficit. China’s condom imports are mainly medium-high end products while its condom exports are dominated by medium-low end ones.
According to CRI, China’s condom market has huge potential. By the end of 2018, China had a population of nearly 1.40 billion people, of which over 900 million are sexually active people aged between 16 and 59. Moreover, premarital sex and commercial sex have grown in the last 30 years, which stimulates the demand for condoms. Commercial sex is prohibited by Chinese law, but it cannot be eliminated. Therefore, the Chinese government encourages night clubs, hotels and other public places to provide condoms to prevent the spread of STDs such as AIDS.
CRI expects that with increasing income and health consciousness, Chinese people will need more and better condoms. For global condom manufacturers and brands, the Chinese market presents numerous opportunities.

Topics covered:
– Policy environment for China’s condom industry
– Supply of and demand for condoms in China
– Government procurement of condoms in China
– Major brands and enterprises of condoms in China
– Import and export of condoms in China
– Retail prices of major condom brands in China
– Survey on condom consumers in China
– Market opportunities and driving forces for China’s condom industry from 2019 to 2023
– Prospect of China’s condom industry from 2019 to 2023

The post Research Report on China’s Condom Industry, 2019-2023 first appeared on CRI Report.

Research Report on Global and China’s Polysilicon Industries, 2019-2023

admin — Wed, 22 May 2019 07:01:16 +0000

Description
In 2018, China’s photovoltaic industry grew steadily in scale, slowed down in capacity construction and saw declines in market prices. According to the China Photovoltaic Industry Association, in 2018, the production volume of polysilicon in China exceeded 250,000 tons, increasing by over 3.30% YOY; the production volume of silicon wafers reached 109.20 GW, increasing by 19.10% YOY; the production volume of photovoltaic cells reached 87.20 GW, increasing by 21.10% YOY; the production volume of photovoltaic modules reached 85.70 GW, increasing by 14.30% YOY. Besides, the newly installed photovoltaic capacity in China decreased to 44.26 million kilowatts by 16.60% YOY, of which the newly installed capacity of photovoltaic power stations decreased to 23.30 million kilowatts by 30.70% YOY while the newly installed capacity of distributed photovoltaics increased to 20.96 million kilowatts by 7.80% YOY.
The global polysilicon production capacity concentrates in China. At the end of 2018, China’s annual polysilicon production capacity was 388,000 tons while that of other countries totaled 210,000 tons. The polysilicon production abroad reached 189,000 tons in 2018 and is estimated to fall to around 160,000 tons in 2019. China is expected to need 430,000 tons of polysilicon and import about 110,000 tons in 2019, which means that domestic demand will be satisfied if domestic production reach 320,000 tons.
China is the world’s largest polysilicon producer. In 2018, Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Henan and Qinghai contributed 156,000 tons, 70,000 tons, 60,000 tons, 45,000 tons, 20,000 tons and 20,000 tons respectively to China’s polysilicon production capacity. In 2019, Xinjiang East Hope New Energy Co., Ltd., Xinte Energy Co., Ltd., Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd. and other companies are expected to increase polysilicon production capacity by over 120,000 tons.
According to CRI, because high-quality polysilicon for monocrystalline silicon production has high technical barrier, the market is dominated by a few suppliers. For example, 15%-20% N-type monocrystalline silicon (minority carrier lifetime ≥1000us) produced from China-made polysilicon is substandard while the proportion will be only 0.90% to 0.50% if imported polysilicon is used. Therefore, China relied heavily on high-quality polysilicon imports in the past few years. At present, the enterprises that can supply monocrystalline silicon in large quantities include domestic companies Leshan Yongxiang Silicon Industry Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of Tongwei Group Co., Ltd.), Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd., Xinte Energy Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of TBEA Co., Ltd.) and GCL-Poly and foreign companies OCI and Wacker Chemie.
In 2018, the production volume of polysilicon in China was about 259,000 tons, increasing by 7.90% YOY. The growth rate fell sharply as compared to 2017. As the production volume varied greatly among different enterprises, the market concentration ratio stayed at a high level. The top 10 enterprises including GCL Silicon Technology Holdings Inc., Xinte Energy Co., Ltd., China Silicon Corporation Ltd., Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd. and Sichuan Yongxiang Co., Ltd. took a market share of 82.50%.
In 2018, as affected by the shrinking demand from China’s photovoltaic industry, the import volume of polysilicon dropped for the first time in the past decade. The import volume of polysilicon in China was 151,300 tons, decreasing by 0.40% YOY; the import value was about USD 2.08 billion, decreasing by 12.30% YOY. The major sources of China’s polysilicon imports include South Korea, Germany, Taiwan, etc.
Since 2011, China’s Ministry of Commerce has initiated anti-dumping investigations against polysilicon from other countries, which inhibited the import of polysilicon and promoted the development of domestic polysilicon industry to some extent.
According to CRI, China will still have huge demand for polysilicon. Domestic polysilicon production can gradually meet the market demand. However, monocrystalline silicon has become increasingly popular in China since 2016 and the production of monocrystalline silicon requires high-quality polysilicon. Pessimistic about the quality of domestic-made polysilicon, Chinese manufacturers of monocrystalline silicon will continue to a large quantity of high-purity polysilicon from Germany and South Korea. It is estimated that from 2019 to 2023, China will import over 100,000 tons of polysilicon every year.
In 2018, the average price of high-quality solar grade polysilicon was 105,900 CNY/ton, decreasing by 21.60% YOY. Overall, the price of polysilicon declined by 50.30% from 153,000 CNY/ton at the year beginning to 76,000 CNY/ton at the year end.

Topics covered:
– Status of global polysilicon industry
– Economic environment and policy environment for China’s polysilicon industry
– Development of the photovoltaic industry
– Supply of and demand for polysilicon in China
– Import and export of polysilicon in China
– Competition on China’s polysilicon market
– Price trend of polysilicon
– Major polysilicon manufacturers in the world
– Driving forces and market opportunities for the polysilicon industry
– Risks and challenges to the polysilicon industry
– Trends of the polysilicon industry

The post Research Report on Global and China’s Polysilicon Industries, 2019-2023 first appeared on CRI Report.

Research Report on China’s Rare Earth Industry, 2019-2023

admin — Wed, 22 May 2019 07:01:15 +0000

Description
Rare earth elements and metals are widely used in the industry. Rare earth elements are essential to aircraft engines, mobile phones and drill bits for oil and natural gas mining. As new energy vehicles are expected to replace traditional fuel vehicles, both military and civilian industries have robust demand for rare earths.
According to CRI, in 2017, China produced more than 80% of rare earth metals and compounds in the world. China’s rare earth exports to the United States accounted for 78% of U.S. rare earth imports while the rare earths from Estonia, France and Japan only accounted for 14% in total. In 2017, the United States imported more than 17,000 tons of rare earth compounds, of which 10,000 tons of lanthanum compounds and 3,600 tons of cerium compounds were from China.
According to CRI, driven by low mining costs (including low labor costs) and low environmental protection costs, in the 1990s, Chinese enterprises started mining and exporting rare earths on a large scale. Consequently, most other countries stopped mining rare earths. In the past decade, China’s rare earth reserves fell sharply. Its proportion in the global rare earth reserves once exceeded 70% while at the end of 2016, the proportion was only 37%. From 1998 to 2015, the Chinese government introduced export quota licensing system for rare earths. On Mar. 26, 2014, the WTO ruled that China’s administrative measures for rare earth exports breached WTO rules. On May 1, 2015, the Chinese government canceled its tariffs on rare earth exports. On Jan. 1, 2016, it abolished the export quota licensing system.
To regulate rare earth mining, in the second half of 2018, the Chinese government began to shut down illegal mining enterprises and cut rare earth production quota to 45,000 tons, down 36% from 70,000 tons in the first half of the year. To upgrade its rare earth industry, China shifts from exporting crude ores to exporting oxide products, which greatly impacts the global rare earth market.
After China Minmetals Rare Earth (Ganzhou) Co., Ltd. and CHALCO Guangxi Branch stopped producing rare earth ores because they failed to meet environmental protection standards, ionic rare earth ores fell short of demand in southern China. Subsequently, Chinese mining investors mined ionic rare earth ores in Myanmar and Vietnam and exported the mined crude ores to China for refining. However, in early Nov. 2018, all levels of government in Myanmar prohibited the rare earth mining activities of Chinese enterprises because of uneven distribution of benefits. In response, China’s Yunnan Customs announced that it would ban all mineral imports from Myanmar. If the policy is strictly implemented, the prices of heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium will increase on the global market. But it is uncertain that how long the import restriction will last and how it will affect the volume of China’s heavy rare earth imports.
China has been the world’s largest exporter of rare earths for years. In 2018, China’s rare earth exports increased to 53,031 tons by 3.60% YOY, making China the world’s largest importer of rare earths.
In 2018, China’s rare earth oxide imports reached about 41,400 tons, increasing by over 100% YOY. Meanwhile, the domestic production of rare earth oxides shrank as China combated illegal rare earth production. China’s rare earth imports are mainly minerals and chemical concentrates from Myanmar and the United States. In 2018, China imported about 26,000 tons of rare earth carbonates from Myanmar, which accounted for about 25% domestic demand. The heavy rare earths from Myanmar accounted for nearly one third of domestic consumption.
U.S. enterprises ship lanthanum-rich ores to China and then buy oxides and chemical products from China. The United States is the major buyer of China’s rare earths, and lanthanum is used to refine oil. Last year, Myanmar became a key supplier of the dysprosium, terbium and gadolinium to Chinese producers of magnets and alloys. In 2018, the United States announced import tariffs on China’s rare earths in its trade frictions with China but later it withdrew this decision. In the long term, China’s rare earth imports will continue to grow. In addition to the United States and Myanmar, Australia is also exporting rare earths to China.
In 2018, the production volume of neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets in China increased by 5% and the consumption increased by about 6%. The supply and demand on domestic market were close to balance. The export volume and export value increased by 11% and 14% respectively.
In 2018, China only approved 115,000 tons of rare earth production quota, giving priority to meeting domestic demand. As a result, the global production of primary rare earth oxides grew by 20.80%. The growth was mainly attributable to the United States and Myanmar. On the other hand, since China started combating illegal rare earth mining in Sept. 2018, illegal rare earth production decreased by 50%. The consequent market gap is filled by other countries. The concentrate imports from Myanmar have become an important source of the dysprosium, terbium and gadolinium for China’s magnet and alloy manufacturing industries.
According to CRI, in China, the mining and refining of rare earths are monopolized by six major state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Non-SOEs only have access to downstream industries such as the production and application of rare earth materials, namely, permanent magnet materials, catalytic materials, luminescent materials, polishing materials and hydrogen storage materials. With the rapid development of global high-tech industries, rare earths are being applied to more high-tech fields and the consumption of rare earth new materials are growing rapidly. The new energy vehicle industry, the wind power industry and other consumers of rare earths all have a promising future, which promotes the development of the rare earth industry. For example, in 2018, the global production of new energy vehicles exceeded 2 million units, among which 1.27 million units were produced in China, up by about 60% YOY. Rare earth hydrogen storage alloys are mainly used in NiMH power batteries. A hybrid electric vehicle needs about 10 kg of hydrogen storage alloy. In general, a hydrogen storage alloy contains 30% mischmetal, which means that a hybrid electric vehicle consumes about 3 kg of rare earths. The drive motor of a hybrid electric vehicle consumes about 1 kg to 3 kg of neodymium-iron-boron magnetic materials; the drive motor of a battery electric vehicle consumes about 5 kg to 10 kg.
According to the plan of the Chinese government, the annual production of new energy vehicles in China will reach 6 million units in 2023. If this goal can be achieved, new energy vehicles will consume 30,000 tons of rare earths or more, which will boost the development of China’s rare earth industry.
According to CRI, the Sino-U.S. trade war has little impact on China’s rare earth industry. For example, in May 2019, the United States again decided not to impose import tariffs on China’s rare earths and other key minerals. It shows that United States still relies heavily on China’s minerals to produce consumer electronics, military equipment and many other products.

Topics Covered:
– Global supply of and demand for rare earths
– Global trade of rare earths
– Chinese government’s policies on rare earths
– Rare earth production in China
– Demand for rare earths in China
– China’s rare earth imports and exports
– Price trends of rare earth and rare earth materials in China
– Major rare earth mining and refining enterprises in China
– Major producers of rare earth materials in China
– Driving forces and market opportunities for China’s rare earth industry from 2019 to 2023
– Forecast on supply of and demand for rare earth in China from 2019 to 2023
– Impact of the Sino-U.S. Trade War on China’s rare earth industry

The post Research Report on China’s Rare Earth Industry, 2019-2023 first appeared on CRI Report.

Research Report on China’s Import Tariff Quotas for Agricultural Products, 2019-2023

admin — Wed, 22 May 2019 07:01:14 +0000

Description
The Interim Measures for Administration of Import Tariff Quotas for Agricultural Products (hereinafter referred to as the Interim Measures) was a government document formulated by China’s National Development and Reform Commission and put into force on Feb. 5, 2002. The Interim Measures determines the annual import tariff quotas for agricultural products according to China’s schedule of concessions on goods in the accession to the WTO. Agricultural imports in quota are subject to low tariff rates while those out of quota are subject to high tariff rates.
According to CRI’s analysis, by May 2019, the Interim Measures applies to agricultural products including wheat, corn, rice, sugar, cotton, wool and wool top. The import tariff quotas for wheat, corn, rice, sugar and cotton are classified into the quotas to state trading enterprises and the quotas to non-state trading enterprises to give priority to state-owned enterprises. The import of wool and wool top is exclusive to designated companies.
CRI believes that China’s tariff rate quota administration for agricultural products has both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it protects domestic agricultural product market from the impact of large quantities of low-price agricultural imports. Low in-quota tariff rates ensure low-cost raw materials to the agricultural product processing enterprises in China. On the other hand, the tariff rate quota administration triggers international trade disputes. For example, in Dec. 2016, the United States filed a lawsuit with the WTO against China’s administration of the import tariff quotas for wheat, rice and corn. In Apr. 2019, the United States won WTO ruling against China’s use of tariff-rate quotas for rice, wheat and corn, which it successfully argued limited market access for U.S. grain exports. Besides, some applicants to the import tariff quotas are not agricultural product processing enterprises but trade companies. They resell agricultural products in quota to agricultural product processing enterprises with price markups. Consequently, agricultural product processing enterprises have to pay more for agricultural imports.
According to CRI, the annual import tariff quotas for some agricultural products cannot be used up. For example, in 2018, China’s corn imports totaled 3.52 million tons, accounting for only 48.90% of the quota quantity of 7.20 million tons; the wheat imports totaled about 3.10 million tons, accounting for only 32.20% of the quota quantity of 9,636,000 tons. Such surpluses are caused by the strict eligibility criteria. Many downstream enterprises (such as feed processing enterprises and food processing enterprises) that fail to obtain the import tariff quotas purchase raw materials from other sources or even purchase agricultural products smuggled into China.
CRI expects that the import tariff quotas for agricultural products will go out of date as China’s foreign trade develops and China’s economy becomes more global. However, most of these quotas will continue to exist from 2019 to 2023 because Chinese government needs to protect the domestic agricultural product market and some state-owned enterprises can make profits from reselling tariff quotas.

Topics Covered:
– Introduction to China’s import tariff quotas for agricultural products
– Analysis on advantages and disadvantages of China’s import tariff quotas for agricultural products
– China’s import of agricultural products subject to tariff rate quota administration
– Major enterprises granted with China’s import tariff quotas for agricultural products
– Forecast on development of China’s import tariff quotas for agricultural products

The post Research Report on China’s Import Tariff Quotas for Agricultural Products, 2019-2023 first appeared on CRI Report.